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THE EROSION OF PUBLISHER LIABILITY 
IN AMERICAN LAW, SECTION 230, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ONLINE CURATION 
BRENT SKORUP
*
 & JENNIFER HUDDLESTON
**
 
Abstract 
As internet businesses started to emerge in the 1990s, online content 
distributors were taken to court for material they published or republished. 
While the court in Cubby v. CompuServe found that the internet-based 
company was not liable, another court arrived at the opposite conclusion in 
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy. Congress resolved the ambiguity by enacting 
the Communications Decency Act of 1996, of which § 230 established a 
broad liability shield for online content distributors. Two decades later, § 
230 has come under scrutiny, and many critics and lawmakers characterize 
it as a drastic deviation from common law that requires correction. 
However, an examination of the relevant case law reveals that courts had 
instead narrowed liability for publishers, republishers, and distributors for 
decades—eventually culminating in the Cubby decision. Section 230, we 
suggest, codified this process by establishing a publisher liability regime 
that likely would have emerged in common law. Based on this legal history, 
we discuss the circumstances under which mandated online content 
takedown could be prudent and practicable as well as those under which 
continuing § 230 protections may prove necessary. 
Introduction 
We are more than two decades into the era of “cheap speech.”1 The 
relatively limited media world of newspapers, pamphlets, and three 
broadcast networks has given way to media abundance from cable and 
satellite television and—most significantly—internet distribution. Online 
content distributors (who act as “intermediaries” between content producers 
and consumers by providing a platform for content without actually 
creating it) such as social media sites, app stores, search engines, and 
                                                                                                             
 * J.D., George Mason University School of Law; B.A., Wheaton College; Senior 
Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 
 ** J.D., University of Alabama School of Law; B.A., Wellesley College; Research 
Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 
 1. See generally Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 
1805 (1995). 
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internet service providers (ISPs) often use intentional, semi-automated, and 
iterative processes to decide what content to omit and transmit. 
Consequently, as media theorist Clay Shirky notes, the centuries-old 
formula of “Filter-then-publish,” has been reversed in the internet age: 
“[P]ublish-then-filter.”2 This rapid shift in editing from “selection” to 
“curation” puts immense stress on traditional publication law and liability.  
To expressly protect online content distributors from punitive liability 
lawsuits over users’ posts, Congress created a broad liability shield in 
section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act. In recent years, this 
liability shield has come under scrutiny from lawmakers and advocates 
across the political spectrum. One primary criticism is that § 230 is a radical 
departure from traditional publication law. This legal reversal, critics say, 
makes harassing or antisocial behavior profitable and leads tech companies 
to discriminate against political opponents or censure unpopular 
viewpoints. Their proposed solutions often involve repealing § 230 or 
narrowing its coverage to increase the liability of online content distributors 
for users’ behavior and content.3  
This Article explores the debate over online content distributors’ 
liability. In particular, it draws on decades of legal trends and defamation 
cases to show that § 230 is not the deviation from common-law liability that 
it is often characterized as. Courts rarely recognize strict liability for 
distribution of defamatory content.
4
 In fact, many courts have recognized 
and endorsed “conduit liability” and the related “wire service defense,” 
which represent powerful protections for newspapers, cable operators, and 
broadcasters.  
                                                                                                             
 2. CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT 
ORGANIZATIONS 81, 98 (2008). This is of course a simplification of the actual process of 
content moderation that often engages in multiple rounds of publication and filtering for 
various content. 
 3. See, e.g., Press Release, Josh Hawley, Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to 
Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies (June 19, 2019), https://www. 
hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-
tech-companies. 
 4. See Lewis v. Time Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 463 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (“The common thread 
in these cases is that there can be no liability absent scienter. The requirement of 
scienter comports with the traditional rule that a republisher cannot be held liable unless he 
had knowledge of the defamatory content, and satisfies the federal constitutional rule against 
liability without fault.”) (citation omitted). 
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Second, much like the Supreme Court “constitutionalized” defamation 
law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
5
 which protected direct publishers 
from liability, First Amendment considerations would likely lead courts to a 
§ 230-like liability protection for republishers such as online distributors—
even in the absence of the law.
6
 While a conduit liability regime would 
have gradually emerged for online content distributors in the absence of § 
230, we conclude the law had—and continues to have—a salutary effect on 
the development of online services. Section 230 protected the nascent 
internet industry at a critical time, and a top-to-bottom reformulation today 
would impose significant transition costs as courts develop an appropriate 
liability regime. 
Part I introduces cases in which courts limited strict liability for tortious 
content distribution by media distributors in the decades before § 230’s 
implementation. This history suggests that the codification of broad 
publisher liability in § 230 simply accelerated the prevailing trend in 
common law. Part II describes the two cases that prompted Congress to 
enact § 230, as well as subsequent cases that further shaped the liability of 
online content distributors. Part II closes by documenting the increasing 
public pressure to repeal or modify § 230. Finally, Part III discusses the 
circumstances in which statutory departures from both § 230 and conduit 
liability would be prudent and practicable while preserving free expression 
online. 
I. The Erosion of Publisher and Distributor Liability 
A popular view states that § 230 “upended a set of principles enshrined 
in common law doctrines” developed for the offline world.7 The notion 
                                                                                                             
 5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. 
Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 825, 825 (1984). 
 6. See, e.g., Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027, 
2032–36 (2018) (arguing that “imposing defamation liability on internet intermediaries is 
unconstitutional” because of the collateral censorship) [hereinafter Note, Section 230 as 
First Amendment Rule]. 
 7. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 373, 411 (2010); see also Mike Masnick, Nancy Pelosi Joins Ted Cruz and 
Louis Gohmert in Attacking CDA 230, TECHDIRT (Apr. 12, 2019, 9:42 AM), https://www. 
techdirt.com/articles/20190411/18521741986/nancy-pelosi-joins-ted-cruz-louis-gohmert-
attacking-cda-230.shtml (quoting House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s characterization of § 230 as 
“a gift” to tech companies). 
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that, absent § 230, online platforms would be “liable like the rest of us”8 is 
a common one that reflects the traditional view of publisher liability.
9
 
Traditionally, as with other torts,
10
 publishers were often held strictly liable 
for the content they published, even if they did not know that a given 
statement was defamatory or otherwise tortious.
11
 However, courts began 
eroding this traditional strict liability regime more than six decades before § 
230 was enacted in 1996.
12
  
This Part traces that legal development away from strict liability, and 
toward fault-based liability, not just for online intermediaries but, more 
generally, for distributors and publishers. Before § 230 was passed, courts 
granted even non-common carriers and media outlets broad liability 
protection for content they republished or transmitted.
13
 
                                                                                                             
 8. Mark Sullivan, The 1996 Law That Made the Web Is in the Crosshairs, FAST CO. 
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90273352/maybe-its-time-to-take-away-the-
outdated-loophole-that-big-tech-exploits (quoting Senator Ted Cruz). 
 9. Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“In the 
absence of the protection afforded by section 230(c)(1), one who published or distributed 
speech online ‘could be held liable for defamation even if he or she was not the author of 
defamatory text, and . . . at least with regard to publishers, even if unaware of the 
statement.’”) (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 10. LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 28 (1941). 
 11. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Radio and TV Defamation: “Fault” or Strict Liability?, 
15 OHIO ST. L.J. 252, 254 (1954) (“The law of libel and slander . . . . is ordinarily thought of 
as a body of law grounded on ‘absolute liability.’”). In the early formation of the law, as far 
back as pre-Norman England, as one commentator puts it, “There is no doubt that all of the 
liability in those days was absolute liability.” ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 28. 
 12. Today, even an online “book publisher” will be found not liable for the content of 
published material if that publisher has only a “minute level of involvement with the author 
of the alleged defamatory material.” Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187, 194 (D. 
Me. 2008). We’re grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making note of this case. 
 13. Our analysis focuses on liability for distribution of defamatory and libelous 
materials, but negligence and fault-based liability also undermined strict liability for 
copyright infringement. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (acknowledging that the copyright 
statutes impose strict liability but declining to hold an internet access provider liable for the 
copying and distribution of copyrighted content); see also Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright 
Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 309 (2015) (“Copyright 
infringement, according to most judges and commentators, is a strict liability tort.”). But see 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (granting partial 
summary judgment for plaintiff where defendant online bulletin board operator distributed 
plaintiff’s copyrighted content). 
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Under the traditional legal standard, “every repetition of a defamatory 
statement is considered a publication,”14 and republishers were as liable as 
the original author.
15
 The first Restatement of Torts articulated this 
traditional strict liability rule.
16
 “Publisher” was interpreted broadly, and 
courts that hewed to this traditional view held liable bulletin board 
owners,
17
 business partners of a publisher,
18
 and even tavern owners who 
tolerated defamatory writing on the walls.
19
  
Over time, however, many courts held that a republisher was more like a 
distributor and therefore could not be held liable for content others created 
absent a showing of fault.
20
 A sliding scale for liability developed, based on 
the degree to which the transmitter or publisher edited the statement. Courts 
have even recognized liability protection for “wire service liability” or 
“conduit liability” to non-common carriers like broadcasters and print 
publications.
21
 Two considerations drive liability protection for distributors 
and publishers: a desire for practical legal rules and free speech norms. 
                                                                                                             
 14. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 799 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 15. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to 
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 95 (1992); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332; 
see, e.g., Leflar, supra note 11, at 254 (“The law of libel and slander . . . . is ordinarily 
thought of as a body of law grounded on ‘absolute liability.’”). Such standards apply widely 
not only to standard reporting but also to opinion pieces and even fictional works. See 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–21 (1990); John Preston, The Murky World 
of Literary Libel, TELEGRAPH (July 14, 2013, 7:00 AM BST), http://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/culture/books/booknews/10172292/The-murky-world-of-literary-libel.html. 
 16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: INTENTION § 580 (AM. LAW INST. 1938); see also 
ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 51 (“The nature of liability for defamation is set forth in 
Section 580 of the Restatement of Torts where it definitely imposes an absolute liability.”). 
 17. Fogg v. Bos. & L.R. Co., 20 N.E. 109, 110 (Mass. 1889) (holding defendant railroad 
that published defamatory statement by placing it on company bulletin board liable). 
 18. Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 17 N.W. 387, 388 (Minn. 1883) (“If he authorized, 
incited, or encouraged any person to do it; or if, having authority to forbid it, he permitted it; 
or, having authority to remove them, he allowed them to remain,-the act was his.”). 
 19. Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (“The theory is that 
by knowingly permitting such matter to remain after reasonable opportunity to remove the 
same the owner of the wall . . . is guilty of republication of the libel.”) (emphasis added). 
 20. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn. State Med. Ass’n Found., 264 
N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978) (requiring that republisher either knew or should have 
known of defamatory nature of the statements transmitted protects libraries and vendors of 
books, magazines, and newspapers). 
 21. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 930–931 (E.D. Wash. 1992) 
(recognizing conduit liability for a broadcast TV station); Church of Scientology, 264 
N.W.2d at 156 (holding that a medical association magazine was a conduit, protected from a 
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A. Practical Considerations Limiting Publisher and Distributor Liability 
Even in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the emerging law of 
negligence was undercutting strict liability for torts.
22
 The erosion of strict 
liability was premised on practical considerations and potential for 
economic harm.
23
 More specifically, commentators recognize that there was 
a desire to give these new-medium publishers more leeway in a growing 
industry.
24
 This negligence law trend away from strict liability was then 
extended to defamation publication and republication lawsuits.  
1. The Wire Service Defense 
With the emergence of news services like the Associated Press during 
the telegraph era, courts recognized that earlier liability theories for 
republication required modification.
25
 For instance, in the seminal 1933 
case of Layne v. Tribune Co., the Florida Supreme Court declined to hold a 
newspaper strictly liable for republishing a defamatory dispatch from a 
news service.
26
 Later cases regarded Layne as creating the “wire service 
defense.”27 The court held that a paper is only liable if “the publisher . . . 
                                                                                                             
defamation suit); Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d 105, 
112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (granting wire service defense to newspaper journalists who relied 
on statements from jail personnel). 
 22. See ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 32 (“There is practically no law of negligence prior 
to the nineteenth century. The greatest development has been since 1875.”); see also Summit 
Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302, 304 (Pa. 1939). 
 23. One motivation of this legal development was that strict liability was too punitive to 
young industries. Scholars like Professor Laurence H. Eldredge tied the growth of 
negligence legal theories to the need to protect “infant industries” and the development of an 
industrial sector. ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 32 (“Another aspect of the developing 
negligence law, was the thought that undue burdens should not stifle infant industries, so that 
any theory of absolute liability was deemed inconsistent with this developing industrial 
community.”). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See, e.g., Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 237 (Fla. 1933) (“[C]ourts can, and 
must, take judicial notice of the fact that in printing an associated press, or other press 
service dispatch, of a purported news happening, emanating from other places or localities, 
the article or news item, as reproduced and published locally, is not considered as the 
original or voluntary composition of the newspaper publisher, who merely reproduces it in 
his daily news columns in the form in which it has been received, but is rather regarded by 
the public as a mere repetition of a publication that has already been made by its real authors 
in their course of disseminating the news.”). 
 26. Id. at 238–39. 
 27. See, e.g., Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476–77 (S.D. Fla. 
1987) (holding that Newsweek magazine was entitled to the wire service defense); 
MacGregor v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 119 So. 2d 85, 86–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/4
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acted in a negligent, reckless, or careless manner in reproducing” the 
story.
28
 The court grounded this holding in the practical and economic 
realities of distributing the news and the public need for efficient, low-cost 
delivery of news:
 
 
No newspaper could afford to warrant the absolute authenticity 
of every item of its news, nor assume in advance the burden of 
specially verifying every item of news reported to it by 
established news gathering agencies, and continue to discharge 
with efficiency and promptness the demands of modern 
necessity for prompt publication, if publication is to be had at 
all.
29
 
The Layne court also drew upon earlier legal principles when excusing the 
newspaper of liability under this defense:
 
 
Those are numerous authorities, most of them of early date, 
which are to the effect that one who hears a slander has a legal 
right to repeat it, if he does so in the same words, and at the same 
time gives his authority for the statement, because of the rebuttal 
of any presumption of malice in such cases.
30
 
The Layne decision and its “practicality argument” gained prominence as 
mass media and broadcast developed. According to contemporary accounts, 
within the first few decades of TV and radio, legal commentators were 
evenly split as to whether strict liability should apply to broadcasters, or 
whether they were more analogous to “disseminators” like bookstores, 
newsstands, and libraries, where fault was needed to impose liability.
31
 
                                                                                                             
Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 725–26 (Mass. 1985); accord 
Rakofsky v. Wash. Post, No. 105573/11, 2013 WL 1975654, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 29, 
2013) (recognizing wire service defense for a plaintiff who published summaries of news 
stories). 
 28. Layne, 146 So. at 238.  
 29. Id. at 239. 
 30. Id. at 237 (citing Waters v. Jones, 3 Port. (Ala.) 442 (Ala. 1836); Johnson v. St. 
Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539 (Mo. 1877)). 
 31. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143, 145–46 (N.J. 1948) (“There are two 
schools of thought as to the act of publishing the defamatory statement by the broadcasting 
medium—one of so-called absolute liability . . . and the other of liability based upon 
negligence . . . .”) (citing Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 83 (Neb. 1932); Summit Hotel 
Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939)); Leflar, supra note 11, at 257 n.22 (citing 
cases on both sides of the dispute). The first Restatement of Torts acknowledged the 
broadcast issue but refused to take a position on it. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: WHAT 
CONSTITUTES PUBLICATION § 577 (caveat) (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (“The Institute expresses 
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2. Other Republication Defenses 
Buttressed by state laws,
32
 Layne precipitated a trend away from the 
traditional view of strict publisher liability in the context of republication. 
For instance, only two years after Layne, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
announced a similar negligence rule for radio broadcast, citing the practical 
burdens of strict liability.
33
 In Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, a Pennsylvania 
hotel brought a defamation lawsuit against radio broadcaster, NBC, in state 
court.
34
 It did so after the host on one of NBC’s sponsored programs 
extemporaneously remarked to an interview guest that a certain hotel was 
“a rotten hotel.”35 The lower court instructed the jury that the statement was 
slanderous per se and held NBC liable.
36
  
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and created a new 
tort: radio defamation.
37
 This new tort deviated from strict liability for 
publishers of libel or slander and created a negligence standard. The court 
held that a broadcaster that leases airtime cannot be held liable for an 
impromptu defamatory statement if the broadcaster exercised due care in 
selecting the lessee, as “there was no possible way in which [NBC] could 
have anticipated or prevented the remark.”38  
Like the Layne court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the 
economic difficulties that would result if strict liability were imposed: “A 
rule should be applied which will not impose too heavy a burden on the 
industry, and yet will secure a high measure of protection to the public or 
those who may be injured.”39 The court also discussed the fact that 
publication law was trending away from strict liability and toward a 
negligence standard.
40
 
                                                                                                             
no opinion as to whether the proprietors of a radio broadcasting station are relieved from 
liability for a defamatory broadcast by a person not in their employ if they could not have 
prevented the publication by the exercise of reasonable care, or whether, as an original 
publisher, they are liable irrespective of the precautions taken to prevent the defamatory 
publication.”); see also id. § 581 cmt. f. 
 32. See Leflar, supra note 11, at 267–71. 
 33. Summit Hotel, 8 A.2d at 310–11. 
 34. Id. at 303. 
 35. Id. at 303 n.1. 
 36. Id. at 303. 
 37. Id. at 312; Leflar, supra note 11, at 262. 
 38. Summit Hotel, 8 A.2d at 312. 
 39. Id. at 310. 
 40. Id. at 304 (“A tort today implies fault or wrong. Tort liability must be founded upon 
some blameworthy conduct, or lack of due care resulting in the violation of a duty owing to 
others.”); see also Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143, 147 (N.J. 1948) (finding that broadcasters 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/4
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Fifteen years after Layne, a legal commentator noted that “the current 
trend is strongly away from strict liabilty [sic] as the governing rule in the 
field of radio and television defamation.”41 A national campaign by 
broadcasters in the early 1950s led most states to pass laws that eliminated 
strict liability for on-air defamation
42
 and typically absolved broadcasters 
from liability if they exercised due care.
43
 This legal trend and these statutes 
proved to be quite useful at limiting costly litigation over rebroadcasts of 
tortious material; in fact, decades later, a federal court failed to find any 
case law interpreting these state broadcaster liability laws.
44
 
3. The Expansion of the Wire Service Defense to Speakers 
Other state and federal courts recognize a wire service defense that is 
broader than the rule in Layne—one that is not limited to republishing wire 
services and news outlets.
45
 The republication defense in Minnesota, New 
York, North Carolina, Georgia, and other states, for instance, is not limited 
to wire services when the original source relied on is apparent.
46
 The 
Massachusetts Appeals Court justified the wire service defense’s broader 
coverage in the following way: “It would pose an impermissible 
burden upon the media and the courts to force them to make subtle 
                                                                                                             
are “disseminators”—thus no absolute liability—and must exercise reasonable care to avoid 
liability for on-air defamatory statements). 
 41. Leflar, supra note 11, at 267. 
 42. Id. at 267–71. 
 43. Id. at 267–70. Judge Learned Hand defined due care in this way: “The degree of 
care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that 
his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and 
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.” Conway v. O’Brien, 
111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 44. Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman, 923 F. Supp. 924, 927 (W.D. Tex. 1996). 
 45. See, e.g., Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (“The New York rule, on its face, is not so limited [as Layne] and, indeed, has been 
applied in a number of cases where the republished material was originally published by a 
source other than a wire service.”).  
 46. Chaiken v. VV Pub’g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1032 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the 
defense where the original source was a noncontract writer for the Village Voice with a 
“sound reputation”); Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn. State Med. Ass’n Found., 264 
N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978) (holding that a medical association magazine was a conduit, 
protected from a defamation suit); Jewell, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 370–71; McKinney v. Avery 
Journal, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 295, 297–98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (granting wire service defense to 
a journalist who relied on daily newspapers for a story in addition to wire services); Van 
Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1989) (granting wire service defense to newspaper journalists who relied on statements from 
jail personnel); see also Cole v. Star Tribune, 581 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
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distinctions between published material that must be independently verified 
and that which does not.”47 
Even speakers—those who curate and edit content48—could avail 
themselves of the “wire service defense” in the publication of defamatory 
content. For instance, in Nelson v. Associated Press, a professional psychic 
brought a defamation lawsuit against several media outlets, including 
Newsweek, for publishing damaging stories about her business.
49
 But the 
Newsweek story at issue was not a wire service story. Rather, the magazine 
had contracted with and published a story from a journalist who had written 
an original story based on defamatory statements in wire service and news 
reports.
50
 Despite the fact this was an original story, not a “mere 
reproduction” like the one at issue in Layne,51 the court held that Newsweek 
was protected by the wire service defense to libel.
52
 The protections within 
the wire service defense expanded and the doctrine grew to encompass the 
new, developing media outlets. 
4. Conduit Liability for Mass Media 
The wire service defense was later extended to television stations with 
the ability to edit, curate, and terminate programs.
53
 As the defense was 
applied to new types of media publishers, it was renamed “conduit 
liability”—akin to the liability of common carriers such as telephone and 
telegraph operators.
54
 However, courts very rarely impose liability on 
                                                                                                             
 47. Reilly v. Associated Press, 797 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
 48. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (finding 
that “exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its 
repertoire” is speech by cable operators). 
 49. Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1471 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 237 (Fla. 1933). 
 52. Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1476–77. This case bears close resemblance to the 
circumstances in Blumenthal v. Drudge, where the court dismissed a defamation case against 
AOL, despite the fact that AOL had commissioned the underlying story. 992 F. Supp. 44, 
51–53 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 53. See Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 2224, 2002 WL 
475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (extending wire service defense to a TV station). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PROVIDING MEANS OF PUBLICATION § 612 cmt. g 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977). According to the Restatement,  
A public utility under a duty to transmit messages is privileged to do so, even 
though it knows the message to be false and defamatory, unless  
 (a) the sender of the message is not privileged to send it, and  
 (b) the agent who transmits the message knows or has reason to know that 
the sender is not privileged to publish it.  
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conduits, even when the conduit operator has knowledge that tortious 
material is being transmitted.
55
 As one scholar puts it, “In practical terms, 
conduits almost never face liability for third-party speech.”56 Though it has 
traditionally been reserved for common carriers, courts have applied 
conduit liability to non-common carriers such as broadcasters and internet 
bulletin boards.
57
 As courts have recognized in other TV programming 
cases, so long as TV broadcasters have “absolute non-involvement with the 
underlying broadcast,” they can avail themselves of the conduit defense to 
liability.
58
 Complaints against conduits are typically dismissed at the 
summary judgment stage.
59
 
In the 1992 Washington State case of Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, a class of 
4700 apple growers alleged defamation against three local CBS affiliates 
for running a 60 Minutes program about chemicals being used in the apple-
growing industry.
60
 As in Layne and its progeny, the court declined to 
impose liability because of the burden it would impose on outlets.
61
 The 
court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ theory, if accepted, would have the 
following effect: 
[It] would force the creation of full time editorial boards at local 
stations throughout the country which possess sufficient 
knowledge, legal acumen and access to experts to continually 
monitor incoming transmissions and exercise on-the-spot 
discretionary calls or face $75 million dollar lawsuits at every 
turn. That is not realistic.
62
 
                                                                                                             
Id. § 612(2). 
 55. Id.; see also Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974) (finding 
telephone company not liable for a recorded defamatory answering machine message even 
when the company knew about the defamatory message).  
 56. Ardia, supra note 7, at 400 (citing Anderson, 320 N.E.2d at 649). 
 57. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 
(D. Ariz. 1996); Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman, 923 F. Supp. 924, 929–30 (W.D. Tex. 
1996); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 930–31 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Lunney v. 
Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999); see also Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell 
Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 2224, 2002 WL 475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (extending 
wire service defense to a TV station). 
 58. Med. Lab., 931 F. Supp. at 1492; see also Merco, 923 F. Supp. at 929–30 
(recognizing conduit liability in granting summary judgment to defendant TV station for 
broadcasting a program with defamatory content).  
 59. See, e.g., Merco, 923 F. Supp. at 929–30. 
 60. Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 930–31. 
 61. Id. at 931–32. 
 62. Id. at 931. 
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Critically, the court recognized that the CBS affiliates “had the power to” 
exercise editorial control over the broadcast and “in fact occasionally [did] 
censor programming . . . for one reason or another” when the affiliate 
“believe[d] the content unsuitable for local consumption.”63 Despite having 
the power to edit the underlying content and occasionally exercising that 
editorial control over content, media companies (like broadcasters) are still 
subject to mere “conduit liability.”64 
B. First Amendment Considerations Limiting Publisher and Distributor 
Liability 
Concern for practicality was not the only factor in the erosion of strict 
liability for republishers and the move toward distributor and, in some 
cases, conduit liability. Courts also expanded legal protection of 
intermediaries and publishers on First Amendment grounds, because 
liability chilled the free exchange of ideas and criticism.
65
  
This “constitutionalizing” of defamation and republication law occurred 
in the latter half of the twentieth century. As Leflar noted in 1954, amid the 
rise of broadcast radio and TV, even broadcaster liability could chill 
speech: 
If, however, no amount of care could guard against the 
threatened harm, the preventive significance [of negligence 
liability] is lessened; it is limited to the possibility of foregoing 
the dangerous activity altogether. When the dangerous activity is 
the dissemination of ideas and information, and the effect in 
practice of foregoing it would be that certain speakers might be 
cut off the air altogther [sic], thus barring legitimate speech in 
order to take no chances on the possibility of something 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. Courts also recognize free speech norms in § 230 cases. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017) 
(noting that “First Amendment values . . . drive” § 230’s creation). 
 64. Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 931–32. Similarly, a federal district court recognized the wire 
service defense to the Associated Press (AP), even though the AP made edits before 
transmitting a defamatory story. Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575, 577, 579–80 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 65. Ardia, supra note 7, at 401–06. Eric Goldman makes a compelling case for why § 
230 is superior to common law and constitutional protection of online providers. Eric 
Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
REFLECTION 33 (2019). However, many of his points deal with the increased liability 
providers would face under distributor liability (scienter, commercial speech, constitutional 
avoidance, etc.). Id. at 36–39. Conduit liability is more protective than distributor liability 
and resembles § 230 in that nearly every complaint can be dismissed. Id. at 39–42. 
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illegitimate being said, the virtue of this pressure toward 
prevention fades rapidly and almost disappears.
66
 
This liability protection for media intermediaries emerged because the 
difficulty in determining the lawfulness of contributors’ speech created 
practical concerns, and broad application of strict liability threatened to 
produce a chilling effect on speech. In 1959, in Farmers Educational & 
Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a 
broadcaster was immune from liability for defamation made by a political 
candidate on the air:
 
 
Whether a statement is defamatory is rarely clear. Whether such 
a statement is actionably libelous is an even more complex 
question, involving as it does, consideration of various legal 
defenses . . . . Quite possibly, if a station were held responsible 
for the broadcast of libelous material, all remarks even faintly 
objectionable would be excluded out of an excess of caution.
67
 
That same year, in Smith v. California, the Supreme Court held that 
imposing strict liability for obscene materials in bookstores is 
unconstitutional because doing so would deprive the public of protected 
material.
68
 Recognizing the deleterious effect a strict liability standard 
could have, the Court reasoned, “If the contents of bookshops and 
periodical stands were restricted to material of which their proprietors had 
made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed.”69  
The Supreme Court continued this trend in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Day.
70
 In 1962, the Court held that the publisher of an erotic homosexual 
magazine was not civilly liable for “obscene advertising” under the 
Comstock Act when it published and distributed ads for companies that 
were being prosecuted for distributing obscene material.
71
 The Court relied 
on both the practicality and free speech justifications for striking down the 
law:
 
 
Since publishers cannot practicably be expected to investigate 
each of their advertisers, and since the economic consequences 
of an order barring even a single issue of a periodical from the 
                                                                                                             
 66. Leflar, supra note 11, at 265. 
 67. 360 U.S. 525, 530–31 (1959). 
 68. 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). 
 71. Id. at 491–95. 
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mails might entail heavy financial sacrifice, a magazine 
publisher might refrain from accepting advertisements from 
those whose own materials could conceivably be deemed 
objectionable by the Post Office Department. This would deprive 
such materials, which might otherwise be entitled to 
constitutional protection, of a legitimate and recognized avenue 
of access to the public.
72
 
Two years later, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
decided the first of what has come to be known as “media defendant” cases, 
which protect robust and uninhibited public communication.
73
 To prevail on 
defamation claims under the fault-based approach, public officials and 
public figures must prove that defendants acted with “actual malice.”74 In 
later cases, the Court expanded the fault requirement to cases involving 
non-media defendants
75
 and even private plaintiffs.
76
  
The First Amendment has also been cited for the recognition of the wire 
service defense in mass media. In Medical Laboratory Management 
Consultants v. ABC, the co-owner of a medical testing facility sued the 
local broadcast station for airing an allegedly defamatory story.
77
 The 
federal district court cited the wire service defense’s First Amendment 
purposes in holding that that the defendant—operating as a “mere conduit” 
that did not in any way contribute to producing the story—could avail itself 
of the defense.
78
 In short, laws that effectively require distributors and 
republishers to follow impractical content moderation practices contravene 
these trends in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
  
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. at 493. 
 73. 376 U.S. 254, 270, 282 (1964); see Gerald R. Smith, Of Malice and Men: The Law 
of Defamation, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 39, 40 (1992).  
 74. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 283–84. 
 75. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762–63 (1985) 
(credit reporting agency). 
 76. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346–47 (1974). A private-figure 
plaintiff, operating under the prevailing negligence standard, need only show that the 
republisher’s effort is less than reasonable. See, e.g., Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 771 P.2d 
406, 424–25, 430 (Cal. 1989). 
 77. 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1489 (D. Ariz. 1996). 
 78. Id. at 1492 (“The wire service defense is consistent with modern First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”). 
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II. Section 230 and the Creation of Modern Internet Law 
Under the traditional view of publisher liability, publishers are presumed 
to know the content of materials that they publish, and they can therefore be 
held strictly liable for tort violations such as libel and defamation
79
 or 
copyright violations.
80
 As recently as the 1990s, legal scholars still debated 
whether the publication liability of internet intermediaries resembled that of 
“print publishers, broadcasters, bookstores, libraries, physical bulletin board 
operators, [or] common carriers.”81 Section 230 brought some certainty to 
that debate and extended liability protection that resembles the conduit 
liability scheme for common carriers. 
A. Divergent Liability Regimes for the Early Internet 
In the 1990s, two New York courts—one federal and one state—
encountered the same question: are online intermediaries liable for 
defamatory content posted by their users? The courts arrived at divergent 
opinions, and before other courts could develop a consensus on the issue in 
a common-law manner, Congress intervened to deliver legal certainty to 
young internet companies and the broader World Wide Web.  
In Cubby v. CompuServe, a 1991 federal case, the developers of a 
computer database sued CompuServe for libel—the publication of 
defamatory statements.
82
 CompuServe operated as a host for many internet 
forums and bulletin boards, and a user denigrated the plaintiffs’ business 
practices on one of CompuServe’s gossip forums.83 CompuServe moved for 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim, arguing that it was a distributor 
(and not a publisher) of the statements.
84
 The court agreed that CompuServe 
was a distributor and granted summary judgment in its favor because 
                                                                                                             
 79. Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Smith 
v. Utley, 65 N.W. 744, 746 (Wis. 1896) (holding managing editor of newspaper liable for 
publication of libelous article whether or not he actually knew of publication because matter 
was constructively under editor’s supervision). 
 80. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198–99 (1931) (holding that 
copyright infringement is a strict liability tort). 
 81. Kean J. DeCarlo, Note, Tilting at Windmills: Defamation and the Private Person in 
Cyberspace, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 547, 551 (1997). Even these analogues cannot answer the 
question of liability exposure for internet intermediaries, as there was an additional sliding 
scale of liability for distributors of content, based on the amount of curation and editorial 
control the intermediary exercised. Id. at 552. 
 82. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 83. Id. at 137–38.  
 84. Id. 
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CompuServe “neither knew nor had reason to know of the allegedly 
defamatory . . . statements.”85 
Though the facts in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., an 
unpublished decision from a New York state court in 1995, closely 
mirrored those in Cubby, the court reached a very different conclusion.
86
 In 
Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment banking firm sued Prodigy, an 
online operator of bulletin boards and forums, for publishing a forum user’s 
libelous statements.
87
 The court distinguished the case from Cubby on the 
grounds that Prodigy exercised more editorial control of user posts than 
CompuServe exercised at the time of Cubby.
88
 The court held that Prodigy 
was liable for users’ content because the Prodigy operators engaged in 
moderation of user content, which equated to the company exercising 
editorial control.
89
 
After Stratton Oakmont, online companies faced two undesirable options 
for limiting their liability for users’ content: (1) engage in costly, constant 
monitoring of user content and take down questionable content; or (2) 
abandon all editorial control, like a common carrier, and leave all content 
online, no matter how offensive. 
Congress resolved this dilemma in 1996 when it passed the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). Though the CDA was originally 
developed as an attempt to protect children by limiting access to 
pornography and obscene material online,
90
 two Representatives proposed 
an amendment to the CDA in direct response to concerns that Stratton 
Oakmont threatened to cripple then-nascent internet technology.
91
 The 
amendment was incorporated into the CDA during conference, passed as 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 141. 
 86. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., Index No. 031063/94, 23 Media 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by 
statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230, as recognized in Shiamil v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 
N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011). 
 87. Id. at 1794–95, 1995 WL 323710, at *1–2. 
 88. Id. at 1797, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. However, Prodigy’s general counsel flatly 
denies that they were screening postings: Prodigy merely had software that blocked posts 
containing one of the “seven dirty words.” Marc Jacobson, Prodigy: It May Be Many Things 
to Many People, but, It Is Not a Publisher for Purposes of Libel, and Other Opinions, 11 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 673, 676–77 (1996). 
 89. Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1798, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. 
 90. See Steven Levy, No Place for Kids?, NEWSWEEK (July 2, 1995, 8:00 PM EDT), 
http://www.newsweek.com/no-place-kids-184766. 
 91. CDA 230: Legislative History, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/ 
issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited Dec. 10, 2019).  
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part of the larger 1996 Telecommunications Act, and eventually codified in 
§ 230.
92
  
Section 230 was distinct from the anti-indecency regulatory framework 
underlying the rest of the CDA. First, § 230 announced a national policy to 
“encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on 
the Internet.”93 Second, § 230’s drafters sought to establish a system 
whereby online service providers would develop and enforce their own 
standards while allowing consumers to select the appropriate standards for 
their needs.
94
 Therefore, § 230 granted civil immunity to internet 
intermediaries for the content that users generate so long as they notify 
users of available parental control options.
95
 Critically, the law expressly 
established that internet intermediaries should not “be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by” a third party;96 
generally, only content creators are exposed to liability.
 
 
B. Broad Coverage of Section 230 Liability Protection 
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down nearly all of the CDA 
as content-based restrictions on speech that violated the First Amendment 
but left § 230 liability protection untouched.
97
 Despite surviving, § 230 
faced numerous challenges in the years that followed. But courts interpreted 
the liability protection broadly and thus allowed online moderation 
standards to develop. 
1. Defamation 
The first major challenge to § 230 liability protection came in Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc. in 1997.
98
 A prankster, who posed as a man named 
Kenneth Zeran
99
 on an America Online (AOL)-affiliated message board, 
advertised products with tasteless slogans about the Oklahoma City 
                                                                                                             
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), (d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90). 
 96. Id. § 230(c)(1). As discussed below, the law also required compliance with relevant 
federal criminal laws, such as those governing child pornography, sex trafficking, and 
copyright law. Id. § 230(e). 
 97. See 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 98. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 99. Kenneth Zeran operated a business in Seattle, Washington at the time the prankster 
uploaded the postings. See id. at 329; see also Steven M. Cordero, Comment, Damnum 
Absque Injuria: Zeran v. AOL and Cyberspace Defamation Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 775, 776 (1999).  
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bombing.
100
 The imposter posted Zeran’s phone number for interested 
buyers, and Zeran soon began receiving media attention as well as 
harassing and threatening phone calls.
101
 Zeran contacted AOL to request 
that the posts be removed, but over the next few days more posts appeared, 
and the harassment continued.
102
 Zeran filed suit against AOL, arguing that 
while § 230 immunized AOL from publisher liability, the law did not 
immunize AOL from distributor liability.
103
 
After losing in federal district court,
104
 Zeran appealed the decision to the 
Fourth Circuit.
105
 The Fourth Circuit found that § 230 protected AOL from 
distributor liability because its purpose was to “create[] a federal immunity 
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the service,” in order “to 
maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to 
keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.”106 The court 
held that distributor liability “is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher 
liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230.”107  
2. Product Authentication  
The CDA text did not limit § 230 liability protection to defamation 
claims, and courts afforded intermediaries immunity from other types of 
liability associated with user-generated content. For instance, in Gentry v. 
eBay, Inc., a California state court found that § 230 liability protection 
protected the auction website from liability for failing to authenticate 
autographed sports and entertainment memorabilia.
108
 Because the website 
did not create the descriptions of the items, select the categories they were 
placed in, or confirm or deny the authenticity of such items, it could not be 
held liable for the actions of third-party sellers regarding the authenticity of 
the memorabilia.
109
  
  
                                                                                                             
 100. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 330–31. 
 104. Id. at 328 (“The district court granted judgment for AOL on the grounds that the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) bars Zeran’s claims.”) (citation omitted). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 330.  
 107. Id. at 332. 
 108. See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 716 (Ct. App. 2002).  
 109. Id. 
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3. Bad Actors on Social Networks 
Early social networking sites also quickly became involved in debates 
over where to draw the line between intermediary and content creator. In 
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., a thirteen-year-old minor accused the social 
networking site of failing to implement basic safety measures to protect 
minors using its services.
110
 The thirteen-year-old minor had evaded 
MySpace age restrictions by claiming that she was eighteen when creating 
an account and was later sexually assaulted by a nineteen-year-old she had 
met on the site.
111
 The plaintiff did not allege that MySpace was negligent 
in failing to remove her profile, but rather that it had failed to take sufficient 
security measures to prevent bad-actor users from preying on minors.
112
 
The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to impose liability on MySpace because 
the minor had violated the site’s terms of service and therefore risked her 
own safety by lying about her age and voluntarily posting information to 
the website without her parent’s supervision.113 
C. Establishing the Limits of Section 230 
Most early cases established that § 230 created broad liability protection 
for internet intermediaries whose users engaged in some form of 
misbehavior. But subsequent cases and legislation have established limits to 
its application. Still, courts have generally recognized that any limitations 
placed on liability protection must be narrowly tailored to ensure that the 
law continues to serve its intended purpose. 
1. Copyright 
One notable exception to liability protection under § 230 arises in cases 
with copyright violations. In fact, subsection (e)(2) specifically states that 
the liability protection should not “be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.”114 In 1998, Congress passed the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
115
 to address two concerns: (1) that 
intermediaries were not adequately addressing copyright violations and (2) 
                                                                                                             
 110. 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 111. Id. MySpace’s age restrictions at the time required its users to be fourteen to create a 
profile. Id. 
 112. Id. at 420–21.  
 113. Id. (providing a transcript of a hearing before the district court that indicates the 
plaintiff’s concession as to lying, disobeying the website’s requirements, and her parent’s 
failure to adequately supervise). 
 114. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90). 
 115. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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that § 230 liability protections removed the incentives for them to address 
those violations.
116
 The DMCA incorporated the Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA)
117
 to create a compromise 
that imposed liability against operators who failed to remove offending 
content after receiving notice and clarified when operators could be held 
liable for copyright violations.
118
  
Under OCILLA, intermediaries or storage providers were immune from 
liability for a user’s copyright violations so long as they did not receive a 
direct financial benefit from the infringement and complied with requests 
for removal of copyrighted material.
119
 Though the statute did not require 
constant monitoring for violations, it did require intermediaries or storage 
providers, on their own initiative, to remove material that a reasonable 
person would know infringed on copyrights.
120
  
2. Intermediaries and Illegal Behavior 
While the protections for intermediaries have grown to immunize the 
young information-sharing industry, courts have found that, many times, 
intermediaries cross the line from “service provider” to “content provider.” 
The distinction between different types of providers plays an important role 
for purposes of liability protection under § 230 because those who develop 
the content’s platform can be liable for the underlying illegal statements.121 
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC 
(“Roommates”) provides an example of a case where a court determined 
that a content provider exercised enough control over content to forfeit its 
liability protection.
122
 Roommates involved a roommate-matching website 
that required users to enter demographic information including gender, 
sexual orientation, and family situation when creating their profiles.
123
 
Users were also able to select, via a drop-down menu, their preferences for 
the sex and sexual preference of potential roommates.
124
 The Fair Housing 
Council alleged that these drop-down menus required users to make 
                                                                                                             
 116. See generally Carolyn Andrepont, Comment, Digital Millennium Copyright Act: 
Copyright Protections for the Digital Age, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. (1999). 
 117. Pub. L. 105-304, Title II, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2877 (1998). 
 118. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2018). 
 119. Id. § 512 (c)(1)(B)–(C). 
 120. See id. § 512 (c)–(d). 
 121. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90). 
 122. See 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–67 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the content at issue is 
required to use the platform). 
 123. Id. at 1165. 
 124. Id.  
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statements and roommate preferences in violation of federal housing 
discrimination laws.
125
  
The district court initially dismissed the case because it found that the 
website was an intermediary that enjoyed liability protection under § 230.
126
 
The Fair Housing Council appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the 
district court and held that § 230 did not protect a website in this 
circumstance.
127
 The court reasoned that an intermediary that “contributes 
materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct” is not entitled to liability 
protection under § 230.
128
 
This distinction between merely allowing users to post content and 
actively encouraging illegal behavior has been an issue in multiple cases, 
notably including those involving sex trafficking, terrorism, and violence. 
However, courts have generally found that § 230 protects intermediaries 
from liability (even when state law might attach a tort violation) so long as 
the online provider was acting in a conduit capacity.
129
 Similarly, § 230 
provides protection for intermediaries who engage in good-faith filtering 
efforts to remove such content but who may fail in a specific case.
130
 
Courts have also generally upheld liability protection for advertisements 
that might include questionable or even illegal activities, such as 
prostitution, provided that the intermediary did not encourage the activity or 
engage in the drafting or placement of the advertisement beyond the 
financial transaction.
131
 In recent cases, such as those against the website 
Backpage.com, more questions have been raised about how far liability 
protection extends when an intermediary assists with or modifies the 
wording of ads as part of the approval process.
132
 
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. 
 126. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, No. CV 03-
09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004). 
 127. Fair Hous., 521 F.3d at 1170. 
 128. Id. at 1168. The case was then remanded back to the lower court, which actually 
found Roommates.com’s activity violated the FHA and FEHA, but the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and held that the website won the case on the merits. Fair Hous. Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 129. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding § 230 
barred the plaintiff’s state law negligence claim, arising from the unauthorized sharing of 
nude photographs of the plaintiff on defendant’s site). 
 130. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90). 
 131. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 132. See Fla. Abolitionist v. Backpage.com LLC, No: 6:17-cv-orl-28TBS, 2018 WL 
1587477, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2018); Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, No. 17-
11069-LTS, 2018 WL 1542056, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2018). 
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In general, federal prosecutors have been able to secure convictions for 
intermediaries that engage in an illegal activity or transaction, as § 230 
liability protection does not cover such scenarios. For example, as Cary 
Glynn details in describing a potential criminal case against Backpage.com 
under an earlier version of § 230,
133
 prosecutors alleged that MyRedbook 
accepted payments to feature certain ads, despite knowing that prostitution 
was likely to be illegal in the jurisdiction and that the ads were being used 
to facilitate sex with minors, and failed to respond to law enforcement 
requests.
134
 Similarly, the government indicted the owner of the website 
RentBoy after an investigation discovered that website employees reviewed 
ads and told advertisers how to rephrase them so as to avoid mentioning 
sexual acts or drawing the attention of law enforcement.
135
 
D. Law, Policy, and Changes to Section 230 
The movement to modify or repeal § 230 has grown over the years as 
internet-based companies have transformed from small startups to some of 
the largest companies in the world. Though it closely tracked the 
development of common law that culminated in the Cubby decision, § 230 
liability protection is often characterized as a radical departure from 
traditional publication law.
136
 According to lawyer Joshua M. Masur, § 230 
is “an exception to the rule of common-law liability for republication.”137 
As UNC law professor David S. Ardia put it, § 230’s creation “upended a 
set of principles enshrined in common law doctrines that had been 
developed over decades, if not centuries, in cases involving offline 
intermediaries. [I]t halted judicial attempts to adapt the common law to the 
                                                                                                             
 133. Cary Glynn, The DoJ’s Busts of MyRedbook and Rentboy Show How Backpage 
Might Be Prosecuted, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 28, 2017), https://blog. 
ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/09/the-dojs-busts-of-myredbook-rentboy-show-how-
backpage-might-be-prosecuted-guest-blog-post.htm. 
 134. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum 2–3, United States v. Omuro, No. 3:14-cr-
00336 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2015). 
 135. Glynn, supra note 133. 
 136. See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 7, at 411; Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The 
Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
137, 137–38 (2008) (characterizing § 230 as a provision “alter[ing] centuries of common-
law precedent [in order] to grant the owners of such private online forums unprecedented 
immunity from liability for defamation and related torts committed by third-party users”) 
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)); see also Masnick, supra note 7 (quoting House Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi characterizing § 230 as “a gift” to tech companies). 
 137. Joshua M. Masur, A Most Uncommon Carrier: Online Service Provider Immunity 
Against Defamation Claims in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 40 JURIMETRICS 217, 218 (2000). 
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changing technology.”138 As another advocate for modifying the current 
system argued, § 230 provides internet intermediaries with “special 
treatment” that makes publishing “harassing, destructive content . . . 
profitable.”139 
Journalists, legal scholars, and advocates have suggested that § 230 has 
contributed to the spread of conspiracy theories,
140
 protected child 
predators,
141
 enabled powerful online platforms to evade local laws,
142
 and 
favored a system that disproportionately censors conservative 
viewpoints.
143
 Law professor Ann Bartow similarly stated that large internet 
platforms are able to “launder the proceeds of hate speech, and happily cash 
the checks” because of their protection from liability.144 In August 2018, 
even Senator Ron Wyden, who drafted § 230 while serving in the House of 
Representatives, wrote that technology companies’ “ineptitude” in filtering 
indecent content is undermining congressional faith in the law.
145
 This 
frustration with § 230 even seems to have penetrated the courts.
146
  
                                                                                                             
 138. Ardia, supra note 7, at 411. 
 139. Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 29, 
2015, 2:31 PM CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-this-
liability-shield/; see also Ann Bartow, Section 230 Keeps Platforms for Defamation and 
Threats Highly Profitable, LAW.COM (Nov. 10, 2017, 1:10 AM), https://www.law. 
com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/section-230-keeps-platforms-for-defamation-
and-threats-highly-profitable/?slreturn=20181030153646.  
 140. Chu, supra note 139. 
 141. See, e.g., Elizabeth P. Stedman, Comment, MySpace, but Whose Responsibility? 
Liability of Social-Networking Websites When Offline Sexual Assault of Minors Follows 
Online Interaction, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 363, 387–90 (2007) (discussing the CDA in 
the context of making a proximate cause argument more difficult). 
 142. See Christopher Zara, The Most Important Law in Tech Has a Problem, WIRED (Jan. 
3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/the-most-important-law-in-tech-has-a-
problem/.  
 143. Sullivan, supra note 8 (“Many Republicans believe that Silicon Valley tech 
companies are determined to suppress conservative content on their platforms.”); see also 
James Altschul, It’s Time for Congress to Treat Twitter as a Publisher, FEDERALIST (Nov. 
29, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/11/29/time-congress-treat-twitter-publisher/.  
 144. Ann Bartow, Online Harassment, Profit Seeking, and Section 230, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
ANNEX 101, 102 (2015) [hereinafter Bartow, Online Harassment]. 
 145. Ron Wyden, The Consequences of Indecency, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 23, 2018, 1:15 
PM CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/23/the-consequences-of-indecency/.  
 146. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Ten Worst Section 230 Rulings of 2016 (Plus the Five 
Best), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/ 
2017/01/ten-worst-section-230-rulings-of-2016-plus-the-five-best.htm (listing cases that 
undermine earlier conceptions of § 230 protection).  
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Both legislative action and political rhetoric suggest that the movement 
to reform or repeal § 230 is gaining traction. In 2018, Congress passed the 
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), 
which amended § 230 to impose liability against intermediaries when users 
conduct sex trafficking activity on their platforms.
147
 Yet many civil-society 
advocates and lawmakers would like to go further, suggesting similar 
carve-outs for societal ills like opioid sales
148
 and hate speech.
149
 For 
instance, legal scholar Ann Bartow has called for reforming § 230 by 
introducing a conditional liability protection that more closely resembles 
the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown system.150 
But even before the creation of § 230, many courts had shifted away 
from the strict liability regime and toward conduit liability protections and 
fault-based requirements.
151
 In many circumstances, even a distributor that 
had known of the tortious material would have been immune from liability 
because the social and judicial norms favoring practicable moderation 
practices and free speech had eroded the traditional liability standards.
152
 In 
effect, § 230 codified the conduit liability protection that courts were 
applying to traditional media distributors—including some cases after 
1996.
153
 
As one federal district court noted in 1994, “[p]rotection for 
republication . . . has not been rigorously circumscribed within the wire 
service context” and covers several types of media intermediaries that 
                                                                                                             
 147. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 
115-164, § 3 (2018). 
 148. Samantha Cole, Senator Suggests the Internet Needs a FOSTA/SESTA for Drug 
Trafficking, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 5, 2018, 1:47 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/8xbwvp/joe-manchin-fosta-sesta-law-for-drug-trafficking-senate-intelligence-
committee-hearing. Many conservatives, for instance, would like to remove the intermediary 
liability because of perceived unfair censoring of conservatives. Sullivan, supra note 8. 
 149. See Wyden, supra note 145 (“There are real consequences to social media hosting 
radically indecent speech, and those consequences are looming.”).  
 150. Bartow, Online Harassment, supra note 144, at 102–03. 
 151. A similar trend can be observed in copyright. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See generally 
Goold, supra note 13. But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 
1993) (finding that an online bulletin board operator is liable for direct copyright 
infringement when users upload copyrighted images, and the operator fails to remove the 
images). 
 152. See also Julio Sharp-Wasserman, Note, Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications 
Decency Act and the Common Law of Defamation: A Convergence Thesis, 20 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 195, 199 (2018). 
 153. See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999). 
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republish content.
154
 And in its 1999 Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co. 
decision, the New York Court of Appeals expressly classified an internet 
bulletin board operator as a common-law conduit.
155
 The court still applied 
the “conduit designation,” even though the bulletin board operator “reserves 
for itself broad editorial discretion to screen its bulletin board messages” 
and occasionally exercises that discretion.
156
 The court explained that even 
if Prodigy had prohibited “certain vulgarities” from bulletin board 
messages, it would have retained its “passive character” in the other posts 
that it did not censor and would not been obligated to “guarantee the 
content of” the messages it did not edit.157 
Lunney resembled the internet intermediary protection found in Cubby, 
which was decided eight years earlier, and was part of the legal trend of 
courts creating protective rules for media intermediaries. Despite tens of 
millions of Americans interacting online in the mid-1990s,
158
 we are aware 
of no case from 1991 to 1996—save Stratton Oakmont—where an online 
distributor was liable for republishing a user’s tortious material.159 Stratton 
Oakmont was therefore an anomaly, not a development of common law.
160
 
The succession of Cubby, the broadcast cases like Auvil, and Lunney in 
the 1990s suggests that the passage of § 230 simply accelerated the 
expansion of liability protection for online content distributors that 
otherwise would have been established by common law, custom, and state 
legislatures. Consistent with this theory, a 2010 study by David S. Ardia 
found that most § 230 cases would have arrived at the same outcome 
regarding whether the distributor was liable under common law.
161
 As 
Ardia states in a discussion of his empirical work, “many of the 
                                                                                                             
 154. Nicholson v. Promoters on Listings, 159 F.R.D. 343, 356 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing 
broadcaster, internet, and newspaper republication cases). 
 155. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541–42 (holding that an internet service provider and bulletin 
board operator, “like a telephone company, is merely a conduit”).  
 156. Id. at 542. 
 157. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting the lower court decision). 
 158. Kara Swisher, Internet’s Reach in Society Grows, Survey Finds, WASH. POST, Oct. 
31, 1995, at A1 (describing a Nielsen poll finding thirty-seven million internet users in the 
United States and Canada). 
 159. At least some courts already viewed Cubby as establishing persuasive precedent that 
an internet intermediary could not be held strictly liable for publishing defamatory 
statements. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. 
Supp. 1361, 1367 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 160. See Matthew C. Siderits, Comment, Defamation in Cyberspace: Reconciling Cubby, 
Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. and Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 79 MARQ. L. REV. 
1065, 1079–80 (1996). 
 161. Ardia, supra note 7, at 480. 
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intermediaries that invoked section 230 likely would not have faced 
eventual liability under the common law because they lacked knowledge of 
and editorial control over the third-party content at issue in the cases.”162 
Still, § 230 had a salutary effect at a critical time. A 2019 report by 
Engine,
163
 a technology startup advocacy group, suggested that without § 
230, the costs of defending against litigation might be ruinous for many 
startups, even if they eventually win the case.
164
 According to the in-house 
and external attorneys consulted for the report, responding to a user-
generated content liability claim through a motion to dismiss alone could 
cost $15,000 to $80,000.
165
 And defending a case through discovery could 
cost a firm anywhere from $100,000 to more than half a million dollars.
166
  
As Ardia points out, § 230’s liability protection gave online providers 
that made decisions regarding third-party content a “breathing space” and 
legal certainty after Stratton Oakmont derailed the Cubby and conduit 
liability trend.
167
 A period of uncertainty—and massive “collateral 
censorship”—would have ensued because online providers do not know in 
advance where their users are located. Any provider with users in New 
York would have been potentially subject to liability for users’ posts under 
the Stratton Oakmont decision. § 230 precluded that turn of events.  
In short, wholesale changes to § 230’s publisher liability regime could 
create a Stratton Oakmont-like situation where online providers feel 
compelled to comply with the strictest state trial court decision to avoid 
exposing themselves to liability for user content. In the long term, for the 
reasons discussed above, courts likely would have extended conduit 
liability-like protections to online providers. However, because the 
traditional view is that the “conduit” designation only applies to common 
carrier or public utility services
168
 and online services do not fall under 
                                                                                                             
 162. Id. 
 163. About Engine, ENGINE, https://www.engine.is/about-engine (last visited Dec. 12, 
2019) (“Engine is a policy, advocacy, and research organization supporting startups as an 
engine for economic growth.”). 
 164. ENGINE, SECTION 230: COST REPORT (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
571681753c44d835a440c8b5/t/5c8168cae5e5f04b9a30e84e/1551984843007/Engine_Primer
_230cost2019.pdf. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Ardia, supra note 7, at 480 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 168. Conduit liability protection typically referred to public utilities. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS: PROVIDING MEANS OF PUBLICATION § 612 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
A public utility under a duty to transmit messages is privileged to do so, even 
though it knows the message to be false and defamatory, unless  
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either category, the amount of time it would have taken for that process to 
occur likely would have exacerbated online content providers’ concerns and 
thus resulted in fear-based overcompliance. 
III. The Next Era of Publishing and Curation 
Section 230 minimized the cost of engaging in content distribution and 
removed some of the online content distributors’ possible fears about 
making moderation part of their business model. It also provides certainty 
that allows online content distributors to conduct their business without the 
risk of protracted litigation. While an examination of the legal precedent 
leading up to the enactment of § 230 suggests that courts would likely 
establish a similar liability regime in common law, repealing § 230 today 
would impose significant costs during the resulting transition period. 
If § 230 is modified to make online intermediaries liable for more types 
of user-generated content, any such transition should be narrowly tailored 
and focused on cases where (1) there is general agreement that the content 
at issue has minimal speech value, (2) where basic software programs or 
nonexpert curators can easily identify the content as impermissible, and (3) 
dedicated content removal efforts would have a limited impact on 
legitimate speech. The massive amount of internet content to be screened, 
however, means that notice liability only seems effective under certain, 
narrow circumstances. 
A. Curation Standards and User-Generated Content Communities Under 
Liability Protection 
Section 230 provided breathing room that encouraged intermediaries to 
develop a wide range of standards for best practices in curation and 
moderation.
169
 In the United States, this statutory regime has allowed norms 
to develop without the need for regulatory enforcement and has also 
allowed communities to determine for themselves what is and is not 
appropriate.
170
 In many instances, online communities set their own rules. 
                                                                                                             
(a) the sender of the message is not privileged to send it, and  
(b) the agent who transmits the message knows or has reason to know that the 
sender is not privileged to publish it. 
Id. § 612(2).  
 169. See Jason Koebler & Joseph Cox, The Impossible Job: Inside Facebook’s Struggle 
to Moderate Two Billion People, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 23, 2018, 12:15 PM), https:// 
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xwk9zd/how-facebook-content-moderation-works. 
 170. See Tarleton Gillespie, How Social Networks Set the Limits of What We Can Say 
Online, WIRED (June 26, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-social-
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However marginal the number of those completely self-governed 
communities, they would likely not exist without § 230 because these 
communities would not have had the opportunity to develop under a stricter 
regime, nor would they be able to afford to comply with regulation that 
mandates employing expensive content moderation algorithms. Although § 
230 allows both large and small platforms to set their content moderation 
standards, it does not place a judgment on whether those standards are good 
or bad.  
Critics of § 230 allege that intermediaries that curate or moderate content 
should forfeit liability protection like the defendant in Stratton Oakmont. 
For example, conservative critics have argued that § 230 requires a degree 
of neutrality in implementing these moderation decisions.
171
 Yet § 230 was 
never about neutrality. As Senator Wyden, one of the original authors, 
stated in an interview, “Section 230 is not about neutrality. Period. Full 
stop.”172 
Instead of focusing on neutrality, courts have distinguished between 
mere moderation decisions and cases where intermediaries exercise more 
control by editing content or encouraging certain behavior. This includes 
cases where the websites encouraged behavior that could violate existing 
laws. For example, in Roommates, when the website created content that 
appeared to violate the Fair Housing Act’s antidiscrimination policy, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the site was not entitled to § 230 protection.
173
 
Similarly, before the enactment of FOSTA and the sex trafficking exception 
from § 230 liability protection, prosecutors indicted top officials from 
Backpage.com for conspiracy, facilitating prostitution, and money 
laundering after they failed to take appropriate steps to prevent advertisers 
                                                                                                             
networks-set-the-limits-of-what-we-can-say-online/; Charlie Warzel, “A Honey Pot for 
Assholes”: Inside Twitter’s 10-Year Failure to Stop Harassment, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 11, 
2016, 8:43 AM ET), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/a-honeypot-for-assholes-
inside-twitters-10-year-failure-to-s?utm_term=.gipx7zY0E#.ubRQYWjyA. 
 171. See, e.g., Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: This Is Ted Cruz’s Playbook to 
Crack Down on Big Tech for Alleged Anti-conservative Bias, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-
202/2019/04/11/the-technology-202-this-is-ted-cruz-s-playbook-to-crack-down-on-big-tech-
for-alleged-anti-conservative-bias/5cae7278a7a0a475985bd3d3/?utm_term=.ec797e19ad22. 
 172. Emily Stewart, Ron Wyden Wrote the Law That Built the Internet. He Still Stands by 
It—and Everything It’s Brought with It, VOX RECODE (May 16, 2019, 9:50 AM EDT), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/16/18626779/ron-wyden-section-230-facebook-
regulations-neutrality. 
 173. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1174–76 (9th Cir. 2008). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/4
2020]     EROSION OF PUBLISHER LIABILITY IN AMERICAN LAW 663 
 
 
from using their website to commit crimes.
174
 This distinction between 
mere moderation and more active engagement has allowed law enforcement 
to punish bad actors while enabling most intermediaries to make a wide 
variety of content moderation decisions. 
In fact, § 230 encourages intermediaries to develop and enforce their 
own standards through a Good Samaritan safe harbor provision and has 
become essential for the growth of the wide variety of services relying on 
user-generated content. This Good Samaritan
175
 safe harbor is core to a 
wide variety of platforms beyond social media by allowing them to make 
choices regarding content moderation without constant concerns of 
litigation and has been illustrated in the variety of platforms that have been 
the subject of cases involving § 230, including review sites, internet and 
mobile service providers, and search engines.
176
 Rather than discouraging 
intermediaries from engaging in content moderation, § 230 has provided a 
way for each individual intermediary to select curation norms without fear 
that an occasional mistake might expose the company to excessive 
liability.
177
 
Allowing intermediaries to develop their own standards has also allowed 
specialized communities to decide whether to restrict or allow content. 
Communities have developed a variety of norms that depend on their users’ 
acceptance of various content, and those norms can vary even within 
platforms as they emerge from interaction both within and between 
communities on the platforms.
178
 For example, as a study of Reddit 
communities noted, while some universal norms apply to moderation across 
                                                                                                             
 174. Tom Jackman & Mark Berman, Top Officials at Backpage.com Indicted After 
Classifieds Site Taken Offline, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018, 5:12 PM CDT), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/top-officials-at-backpagecom-indicted-after-
classifieds-site-taken-offline/2018/04/09/0b646f36-39db-11e8-9c0a-
85d477d9a226_story.html?utm_term=.227623710afd. 
 175. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90).  
 176. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (involving a review site); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(involving a mobile and ISP provider); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 
2006) (involving a search engine). 
 177. See How Social-Media Platforms Dispense Justice, ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/09/06/how-social-media-platforms-dispense-
justice. 
 178. See Eshwar Chandrasekharan et al., The Internet’s Hidden Rules: An Empirical 
Study of Reddit Norm Violations at Micro, Meso, and Macro Scales, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE ACM ON HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 32:1 (2018), http://eegilbert.org/papers/ 
cscw18-chand-norms.pdf. 
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the entire online community, individual subreddits
179
 and related groups of 
subreddits developed more specific norms.
180
  
As it was written, § 230 encouraged the development of an environment 
where such diversity of options was possible. Even absent strict regulation, 
most platforms prefer to exclude obscene and graphic material as a way to 
grow their user bases and make it easier to cultivate relationships with 
potential advertisers or other financial supporters.
181
 Yet individual 
platforms and even communities within these platforms may still arrive at 
different decisions on contentious content, including decisions about what 
might be considered harassment or hate speech, or what content deserves a 
warning.
182
 Additionally, particularly for parental controls, a wide range of 
options—from barely monitoring to highly restrictive—has developed both 
by individual platforms and ISPs as well as third party services to provide 
users with a variety of methods for choosing which content to block.
183
 
The organic evolution of terms of service and norms within online 
communities, as opposed to top-down regulation, has enabled a wide 
variety of online communities to develop. Content moderation decisions 
often affect the formation of these communities and the interactions of their 
users.
184
 In general, many active communities create a global marketplace 
for both goods and ideas that would be unimaginable without an open 
internet. Even before the rise of social media, online communities that were 
organized by shared interests such as professional groups, hobbies, and 
sports teams arose and maintained (or expanded) existing local 
communities.
185
 These self-organizing groups and communities may 
become increasingly insular as people tend to interact with like-minded 
                                                                                                             
 179. Id. at 32:2. 
 180. Id.  
 181. See Tarleton Gillespie, Regulation of and by Platforms, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL MEDIA 254, 262 (Jean Burgess et al. eds., 2017). 
 182. See Chandrasekharan et al., supra note 178, at 32:16–32:21. 
 183. See Jennifer Huddleston, Technology Is Not Your Parent: But Innovation Can Be a 
Parent’s Best Friend, MEDIUM: PLAIN TEXT (Jan. 16, 2018), https://readplaintext.com/ 
technology-is-not-your-parent-4fc6d2df99ff. 
 184. See Yuqing Ren & Robert E. Kraut, A Simulation for Designing Online 
Community: Member Motivation, Contribution, and Discussion Moderation 21–24 (2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b15b/603c3f4460439a7f6f868ad 
f868bad4929fb.pdf. 
 185. Jenny Preece et al., History of Online Communities, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMMUNITY 1023 (Karen Christensen & David Levinson eds., 2003).  
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individuals and consume information and advertisements that reinforce the 
community’s pre-existing beliefs.186  
Yet the internet has generally been a powerful force for providing a 
global platform that has low barriers to entry and can empower 
marginalized individuals to become involved in commerce or speech in 
ways they traditionally could not. For example, microwork platforms
187—
websites that unite a large number of individuals who each complete small, 
relatively simple task—allow individuals who were previously excluded 
from the workforce to participate.
188
 Similarly, online platforms have 
amplified voices in social movements that might have otherwise gone 
unheard.
189
 
In summary, § 230 immunizes online intermediaries from liability for 
user-generated content, regardless of their size. Therefore, any changes that 
limits liability protection will impose compliance costs on all 
intermediaries. Any such change should explicitly recognize those social 
costs as well as the advantage it will create for larger firms with the 
resources to comply. No matter how well intended any such change may be, 
it must account for the chilling effect on innovation by startups and small 
firms, as well as the artificial barriers to entry that will entrench incumbent 
firms. 
B. Notice Liability for Online Distributors 
When weighing the proper level and scope of regulation, courts and 
legislatures must balance competing concerns between what liability is 
appropriate and what liability is feasible. They also must consider the 
potential unintended consequences of what such regimes may result in, 
including both over action and under action. 
                                                                                                             
 186. See Dimitar Nikolov et al., Measuring Online Social Bubbles, PEERJ COMPUTER SCI. 
(Dec. 2, 2015), https://peerj.com/articles/cs-38/. 
 187. See, e.g., AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com (last visited Jan. 8, 
2020) (advertising that individuals and businesses can utilize Amazon’s platform to 
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 188. See Empowering Women Through the Internet, INT’L DEV. RES. CTR., https://www. 
itu.int/en/Lists/consultationOct2017/Attachments/56/Empowering%20women%20through%
20the%20Internet_Jan2018.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2019). 
 189. See David Meek, YouTube and Social Movements: A Phenomenological Analysis of 
Participation, Events, and Cyberplace, 44 ANTIPODE 1429, 1436–43 (2012) (discussing one 
example of the use and impact of social media on social movements via analysis of Invisible 
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 Section 230 anticipated the Supreme Court’s liability maxim in 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, a 2001 decision about (offline) intermediary liability: 
“The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an 
appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.”190  
Legislative changes to intermediary liability should keep that maxim in 
mind, and any modifications to § 230 must account for the huge amount of 
content that social media and online distributors transmit. Every minute, 
more than 87,500 tweets and 2.1 million snaps
191
 are sent, and over 3.8 
million searches are conducted.
192
 As the Zeran court noted, “liability upon 
notice has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech. . . . Because 
service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of 
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive 
simply to remove messages upon notification . . . .”193 Given the scale and 
increasing number of products that rely on user-generated content, such as 
review sites and messaging services, content moderation at scale remains an 
incredible challenge for platforms—even as artificial intelligence improves 
and companies hire more content moderators.
194
 
1. When Notice Liability Succeeds 
Section 230 reform proposals would create more categories for which 
intermediaries are subject to notice liability.
195
 But exposing intermediaries 
to additional notice liability undermines the purposes of § 230. As the 
Zeran court recognized, “[L]iability upon notice reinforces service 
providers’ incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation.”196 
However, notice liability or automated or semi-automated rejection of 
                                                                                                             
 190. 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001). 
 191. The colloquial term for photos or videos sent via SnapChat. 
 192. Jeff Desjardis, What Happens in an Internet Minute in 2019?, VISUAL CAPITALIST 
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/what-happens-in-an-internet-minute-in-
2019/. 
 193. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 194. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (involving a review site); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(involving a mobile and ISP provider); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 
2006) (involving a search engine); see also Jacob Parker Black, Note, Facebook and the 
Future of Fair Housing Online, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 717–18 (2020) (proposing that the 
implementation of both “input filtration” and “ex-post analysis” is the most effective and 
practical solution for moderating internet speech). 
 195. See Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: Does the Internet Still Need 
Section 230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597 (2019) (proposing notice liability for 
Internet platforms for torts online).  
 196. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. 
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antisocial content could be effective in some circumstances: (1) where there 
is a social consensus that the content in question has minimal speech value, 
(2) where basic software programs or nonexpert curators can easily identify 
the content as impermissible, and (3) dedicated removal efforts result in 
limited collateral censorship. 
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Bartnicki, “third party” speech can 
be suppressed when “the speech at issue is considered of minimal value.”197 
Section 230 implies this limitation since it does not protect content that is 
obscene or otherwise violates criminal law.
198
 In some cases, notice liability 
for this antisocial content has been effected by statute
199
 and supplemented 
through an industry-wide best practice or unified stance.
200
  
Perhaps the best illustration of censoring minimally valuable speech has 
been the identification and removal of clearly antisocial content: child 
pornography and similar child abuse. As the Supreme Court noted in New 
York v. Ferber, “[t]he value of permitting live performances and 
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”201 As a result, intermediaries have 
generally been willing to cooperate with federal investigations of such 
material.
202
 This willingness stems not only from the establishment of 
                                                                                                             
 197. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 530 n.13 (2001) (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 
U.S. 103, 110 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982)). 
 198. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90). 
 199. See, e.g., id. § 230(e). 
 200. There is widespread use by social media sites and websites to automatically filter 
and report illegal child abuse images, for instance, with use of Microsoft’s PhotoDNA 
database. See PhotoDNA, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2020). There are also informal best practices by social media companies to 
remove certain violent, livestreamed content. See, e.g., Social Media Platforms Say They Are 
Taking Action to Remove Christchurch Shooting Content, CNA (Mar. 15, 2019, 7:28 PM), 
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/technology/social-media-platforms-say-they-are-
taking-action-to-remove-11348974. 
 201. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. 
 202. See Weakening Section 230 Won’t Prevent Sex Trafficking, TECHFREEDOM (Aug. 
3, 2017), http://techfreedom.org/weakening-section-230-wont-prevent-sex-trafficking/ 
(discussing that the safe harbor provision incentivizes the platform operators’ active 
involvement in monitoring for illegal activity); see also Guidelines for Law Enforcement, 
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support# 
16.5 (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (illustrating how one company handles law enforcement 
takedown requests). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
668 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:635 
 
 
potential criminal liability but also from intermediaries’ general agreement 
about what material is a violation and why the violation is harmful.
203
  
Not only has notice liability assisted in the removal of such detrimental 
material, but it has also created a market for new screening software that 
automatically identifies and removes that material.
204
 The general 
acknowledgment of this harm has also encouraged intermediaries to share 
technologies and research.
205
 The collateral censorship from these image 
removals does not appear to suppress much legitimate, high-value speech. 
2. When Notice Liability Is Less Successful 
For other categories of content like hate speech and cyberbullying, the 
consensus on what constitutes content that should be subject to removal is 
less clear, and law enforcement takedown requirements could limit 
legitimate and protected speech. Defamation and other intentional torts are 
not always easy to identify or prove, even by courts considering the 
issues.
206
 This lack of consensus favors approaches that allow a diverse 
market for content moderation. 
While notice liability has succeeded in reducing images of child 
pornography and abuse, it has produced mixed results for copyright and 
other intellectual property violations. Notably, the DMCA has struggled 
with numerous false positives—falsely characterizing content as violating a 
copyright when it does not—and easy-to-navigate loopholes that prevent 
intermediaries from identifying all potentially infringing material.
207
 There 
are several reasons why the DMCA has been less successful in changing 
user or intermediary behavior for content that may infringe on copyrights 
than the exception to § 230 liability protection for child pornography. 
First, copyright violations are often more difficult to identify. As a result, 
basic software and nonexpert moderators have a hard time flagging and 
screening copyright violations with a high degree of reliability. For 
example, fan videos and fanfiction that involve characters and images from 
                                                                                                             
 203. See Jemima Kiss, How Microsoft, Google and ISPs Aim to Halt Child Abuse 
Images, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:05 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2013/nov/18/microsoft-google-summit-halt-child-abuse-images. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 530–31 
(1959) (“Whether a statement is defamatory is rarely clear. Whether such a statement is 
actionably libelous is an even more complex question . . . .”). 
 207. See Brad Stone, The Inexact Science Behind D.M.C.A. Takedown Notices, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS (June 5, 2008, 11:18 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/the-
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copyrighted material are typically not considered violations, but the same 
clips or quotes may violate copyrights in other contexts.
208
 Parodies and 
creative uses may also change what is or is not a violation but require 
greater consideration of context to determine whether or not such uses 
constitute a violation.
209
 
Second, notice liability encourages intermediaries to adopt an “act first, 
question second” approach that exacerbates the potential for abuse and false 
positives when no harm has actually occurred. For example, YouTube has 
removed a singer’s own concert video based on DMCA complaints210 and 
removed a video of a Star Wars clip without John Williams’s score for 
violating the score’s copyright by not having it there.211 While these 
examples may seem extreme, in 13.3% of takedown requests in a sample, 
the underlying infringing content cannot be located, and for another 6%, the 
allegedly infringed work cannot be identified.
212
  
Third, the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown requirements establish barriers 
to entry for new competitors because notices from others, by their nature, 
require repeated investigation. A small company that publishes user-
generated content but has limited resources must dedicate at least some of 
its staff to responding to takedown requests even though they may turn out 
to be false. But by failing to remove allegedly infringing material, a 
company would risk exposing itself to crippling liability.  
Finally, notice liability ignores the potential benefits of modifying and 
reproducing copyrighted material, such as parody and fair use. Overbroad 
                                                                                                             
 208. See generally Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and 
Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2009). 
 209. Andrew S. Long, Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing 
Copyright to Promote the First Amendment Values of Transformative Video, 60 OKLA. L. 
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 210. Mike Masnick, YouTube Takes Down Ariana Grande’s Manchester Benefit Concert 
on Copyright Grounds, TECHDIRT (June 7, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/ 
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 211. Tim Cushing, Warner/Chappell Issues Copyright Claim Over YouTube Video 
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 212. Jennifer M. Urban et. al, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 93–94 (Univ. 
of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 27556282017, 2017), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
670 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:635 
 
 
DMCA takedown requests limit the set of ideas that can be spread without 
necessarily improving the veracity or quality of published material as a 
whole by creating strict limitations for the sharing of copyrighted 
material.
213
 The history of the DMCA illustrates that such increased liability 
creates two broad categories of costs: (1) enforcement costs and (2) social 
and litigation costs associated with false positives.
214
  
Because of these looming costs, notice liability should be limited to a 
clearly defined set of material that is egregiously offensive. Any such 
change to the § 230 liability regime must consider the inevitable difficulties 
and social costs that false positives will create and avoid expanding to 
content that by its nature resists clear, technical characterization. The 
significant number of deficient takedown notices generated under the 
DMCA should serve as a cautionary tale when considering expanding 
notice liability to other areas. 
3. Potential Applications Based on This Framework 
With the recognition of many of these limitations in mind and the 
potential of emerging consensus around identifiable harmful content in 
mind, we consider “revenge porn” as one area where notice liability may 
prove more effective and practicable than the DMCA’s imperfect notice-
and-takedown provisions—and where there is sufficient agreement within 
most internet communities about the harm or potential for harm. According 
to the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, forty-six states and the District of 
Columbia have laws concerning revenge porn—the nonconsensual 
distribution of another individual’s sexually explicit images.215 Some 
platforms—including Google, Microsoft, Reddit, and Twitter—already 
have policies to remove such content on request or recognize that such 
content violates the site’s terms of service.216 These policies illustrate an 
                                                                                                             
 213. See generally Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 
18 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 501, 503 (2003) (discussing whether “academic encryption 
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 214. Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 319, 320–22 (2013). 
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MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (July 22, 2015), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/07/ 
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Revenge Porn from Search Results, SLATE (June 19, 2015, 3:12 PM), 
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emerging understanding that the potential harm of such content outweighs 
its speech value. 
Laws that criminalize revenge porn could face First Amendment speech 
challenges if they are overbroad and thus criminalize legitimate speech.
217
 
As a result, imposing notice liability might allow intermediaries to limit 
harmful and harassing content while protecting legitimate First Amendment 
speech. By only requiring removal upon notice, any such change to § 230’s 
regime would allow harmed individuals to request a takedown of 
information that was shared without consent, much like for a copyright 
violation. As in the case of copyright violations under the DMCA, these 
requests would be subject to a review process or a proscribed method for 
appealing a decision to remove the content. But in this case, false positives 
seem less problematic because the value of the speech restricted is 
generally considered low, while the risk of harm from nonconsensual 
distribution is patent.  
If notice liability were applied to revenge porn, safe harbor provisions 
should also be created to limit liability when it is not reasonable for a 
platform to keep pace with a novel violation or the quantity of content. 
Additionally, encouraging intermediaries to develop tools that identify and 
flag such content (like tools that identify and remove child pornography) 
should accompany laws implementing this liability to make it feasible for 
intermediaries to protect themselves from increased liability, regardless of 
their size.  
Notice liability is successful when intermediaries can employ a 
reasonable screening mechanism that can clearly identify a harm and user 
content clearly violates an established standard. Unfortunately, there are 
few such generally-agreed-upon norms. Despite the narrow circumstances 
under which notice liability is successful, proposals to amend § 230 by 
imposing notice liability requirements should be limited to a narrow set of 
content that is widely recognized as offensive and harmful, like child 
pornography. 
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Despite the benefits of this system, any notice liability regime can invite 
opportunistic use of notice.
218
 Specifically, it is foreseeable that politically 
controversial speech and business product reviews would be the most likely 
targets in notice liability regimes due to the proprietary and social gains 
associated with successful messaging.
219
 Therefore, exceptions to § 230 and 
conduit liability should be designed with the expectation that takedown 
notices will be abused. Ultimately, when making these determinations, 
lawmakers must carefully weigh the harm to individuals, the efficacy of a 
notice liability regime for the type of content at issue, the risk and extent of 
collateral censorship, and the culpability of the online intermediary. 
Conclusion 
The § 230 reform movement is growing, and many reform arguments 
complain that online intermediaries receive a special dispensation regarding 
publisher liability. However, publisher liability is more complicated than § 
230’s reformers’ characterizations. Starting in 1933—and for six 
subsequent decades—courts gradually chipped away the regime of strict 
liability for publishers and content distributors. They did so based on the 
practical difficulties of requiring all intermediaries to screen all media 
content for potentially tortious material and unnecessary restrictions on 
First Amendment-protected speech. Culminating with the decision in 
Cubby, courts eventually established that mass media distributors warranted 
extensive liability protections, including protection for conduit liability.  
When the anomalous 1995 Stratton Oakmont decision was released, 
Congress swiftly resolved the dissonance by enacting section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act in 1996. Section 230 codified earlier 
precedent and established a regime of liability protection for online content 
distributors at a time when internet firms had grown to reach audiences of 
tens of millions of people. Reformers’ arguments gained urgency in recent 
years; Congress gave the reform effort traction when it passed FOSTA in 
2018. By amending § 230 to impose liability against intermediaries when 
users conduct sex trafficking activity on their platforms, Congress signaled 
that other categories of anti-social content might also properly be excluded 
from § 230’s broad liability protection. 
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But while reformers may interpret FOSTA as signaling a departure from 
§ 230’s publisher liability scheme, anti-social content should only be 
excluded in narrow circumstances where widely available software and 
nonexpert content moderators can clearly identify content that may be 
subject to removal. Pragmatic and First Amendment concerns that informed 
decades of publisher and conduit liability cases are still relevant to the 
ongoing debate about content moderation, and any debate surrounding the 
future of § 230 should be informed by these precedents.  
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